

# COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW

*The official organ of the Comparative Education Society*

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## EDITORIAL

This issue of the *Review* contains three articles devoted to education in the new countries of Asia and Africa. These are problem rather than area studies. Dr. Hans' contribution on nationalism in the Middle East and South East Asia, Dr. van der Kroef's discussion of social mobility in Indonesia, and Mr. Low's references to the race situation in South Africa illustrate some of the ways in which education is implicated in the non-educational processes of society. It is clear, as Dr. Templeton's article once again reminds us, that the study of these relationships is the vital obligation of comparative education. Without their thorough appraisal, comparative education has no predictive value and hence no aim and no foundation.

The firm establishment of comparative education as a discipline, of which Dr. Heath writes, depends on continuous development of its ethical, theoretical, and methodological dimensions. But it also depends on patient and scrupulous collection of facts. It is not wholly correct to say that comparative education has suffered from too much dedication to fact-finding. It has rather suffered from dull, unimaginative and tendentious presentation of them. Dr. Medlin's paper, the first of many to flow from the newly established channels of communication between the U. S. Office of Education and Moscow, illustrates the *Review's* intention to reserve for scholarly descriptions a respected place on its pages.

A new area of research which is being steadily opened up in international education carries important implications for comparative education. An increasing number of publications have appeared dealing with the nature of intercultural contacts. General works on the subject have included Cora Du Bois, *Foreign Students and Higher*

*Education in the United States* (American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., 1956); UNESCO, "Cross-Cultural Education and Educational Travel," *International Social Science Bulletin*, (v. VIII, No. 4, 1956); and M. Brewster Smith (ed.) "Attitudes and Adjustment in Cross-Cultural Contact: Recent Studies of Foreign Students," *The Journal of Social Issues*, (v. XII, No. 1, 1956). From among the more specific studies India has received the most attention, with: John and Ruth H. Useem, *Western Educated Man in India*, (Dryden, N. Y., 1955); P. M. Balasundram, *What Do American Students Think about India*, (N. Y., 1957), and R. D. Lambert and M. Bressler, *Indian Students on an American Campus*, (Minnesota U. P., 1956). Studies of other area include: J. Watson and R. Lippitt, *Learning Across Cultures, A Study of Germans Visiting America*, (University of Michigan, 1955); F. D. Scott, *The American Experience of Swedish Students*, (Minnesota U. P., 1956); R. Beals and N. D. Humphrey, *No Frontier to Learning, The Mexican Student in the United States*, (Minnesota U. P., 1957); forthcoming, J. W. Bennet, H. Passin, and R. K. McKnight, *In Search of Identity, The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan*, (Minnesota U. P., 1958); and I. D. London and O. Amisimov, "The Soviet Propaganda Image of the West," *Psychological Reports*, (Southern U. P., 1957, 3).

New writings in comparative education include several noteworthy articles: D. M. Gates, "Basic Research in Europe," *Science*, April 1, 1958; Harry D. Gideonse, "European Education and American Self-Evaluation," *Educational Record*, July, 1958; Wm. Clark Throw's two articles on the U.S.S.R. and the U. S. ("The Russians, the Scientists and American Educa-

tion," University of Michigan School of Education *Bulletin*, March, 1958; and "Is Education in the U.S.S.R. a Model for America?" in *Vocational Guidance Quarterly*, Spring, 1958); Robert J. Havighurst, "Is Russia Really Out-Producing Us in Scientists?" *School and Society*, April 26, 1958; C. H. Dobinson, "English and Russian Education Contrasted," *Educational Forum*, May, 1958; George Bereday, "Comparative Approach to Social Status in English Education," in *Liberal Traditions of Education*, Lauwerys, "Methoden in Der Vergleichenden Pädagogik," *Bildung und Erziehung*, February, 1958.

Of special interest are the several contributions published in connection with the current high school debate on the merits of foreign educational systems, sponsored by the National University Extension Association. The articles on Soviet Union, France, and Britain which *Current History* made available in its July, August, and September 1958 issues include to name only few: George L. Kline, *Soviet Education Towards Literacy*; Solomon M. Schwarz, *Education for Russian Industry*; Michael S. Rywkin, *Education for Communist Leadership*; Hugh M. Pollard, *The Goals of French Education*; Henri Peyre, *Secondary Education in France*; Leon S. Roudiez, *The French View of Liberal Arts*; I. L. Kandel, *The Administration of Education in England and Wales*; Claude Eggertsen, *English Education for Science and Technology*; and George Z. F. Bereday, *A Comparative Look at English, French, and Soviet Education*.

The two volumes of the *Thirty Second Discussion and Debate Manual, 1958-1959* edited by Bower Aly under the title *American Education* contain numerous articles and comments contributed directly for this symposium (vol. 1) or reprinted from other sources (vol. 2). Of the several contributions only a proportion is comparative in content and among these, irrespective of their message, not all satisfy methodologi-

cal rules of comparative disciplines. James Robinson's *American Education: Analysis and Interpretation*, and George Bereday's *A Note on the Pitfalls in Comparative Education* discuss the problem of methods. From among the others the following deserve particular mention: Philip Marson, *We Can Learn from the British*; William E. Drake, *A Program of Education Adequate for the United States in 1958*; W. Norwood Brigrance, *An Indictment of European Education*; Paul Woodring, *The Road to Improvement in American Education*; Joseph Lauwerys, *The Essential Features of the Educational System of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*; Barbara Alcorn, *Tradition and Education in England*; I. L. Kandel, *Education in France*; William W. Brickman, *The Essential Features of Soviet Education*; Denis de Rougemont, *Education: Soviet, American and European*; Lothar Kahn, *American and Continental Education*; Russel I. Thackrey, *Facts and Myth in American Education*; and Richard G. Browne, *The Civil War in Education*.

In connection with the debate comparative education has also been featured on a national radio network. In September 1958, NBC recorded and offered for broadcasting a panel discussion between Louis M. Hacker and George Bereday of Columbia University, Raymond F. Howes, editor of the *Educational Record*, and Paul Woodring, consultant to the Ford Foundation. The discussion moderated by Wilbur E. Gilman of Queens College centered around the problem of best methods to improve American education and the definition of what would actually represent such an improvement. The panel fortunately agreed as regards the central question of the debate that no educational system can be transplanted to another country without regard for the historical and cultural roots of the area. It thus denied the premise that American education can be improved by adoption of the methods of foreign educational systems. This conclusion is, of course,

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one of the basic premises of comparative education.

The summer of 1958 was a period of extensive travel in the pursuit of the various comparative education projects. The Soviet Field Study for 1958, organized by the Comparative Education Society, in August and September took Drs. W. W. Brickman, William H. Johnson, and Gerald Read, together with some seventy-five American educators, for a month's visit to Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, and Tashkent. The Study received a grant from the Fund for Advancement of Education, and will result in a volume on *Problems and Trends in Soviet Education*, to be published by Houghton Mifflin.

Among other comparative tours this summer were: The U. S. Office of Education official exchange visit to the Soviet Union in May (Dr. Lawrence E. Derthick), the first of a large program of educational exchanges between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The visit will be described in an official report of the U. S. Office of Education; Teachers College, Columbia University's Traveling Seminar (Dr. Goodwin Watson and Dr. James E. McClellan) which studied England, Denmark, Soviet Russia and Poland during the month of June; Wayne State University's annual tour to Europe (Dr. William Reitz), which visited twelve countries between June and August; the University of Michigan's Workshop Study Tour in June and July (Dr. Claude Eggertson and Edgar Wesley) which was concerned with Secondary Education in Great Britain; the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.'s Seminar in Soviet Education (Dr. George Bereday), which gathered American, European, and Soviet refugee scholars in Munich, Germany, in July, and which will result in a volume—*Essays on Soviet Education*; and the U. S. Department of State official exchange visit to the Soviet Union in June and July (Dr. Edward H. Lichfield), to study higher education. This visit, too will be described in an official report.

Two tenets of comparative education are involved in these travels. The first concerns the language. There is little to a tour through foreign schools with an interpreter, particularly if provided by the country visited. To be cut off from the radio, press, and ordinary discourse, to fail to understand posters, overheard snippets of street conversations, and unintended comments of school people and school children, is to expose oneself to isolation which is bound to skew the accuracy of one's observations. Obviously travel without language is better than no travel at all. But to attempt to publicize as scholarly conclusions the impressions thus obtained is to rend less than justice to one's academic obligations. There may be some suitable justification, even if only the lack of opportunity or time, for undertaking visitation of foreign schools without knowing the language they use. But there is absolutely no justification for returning from a period of travel abroad ignorant of the rudiments of the languages one encountered. Current and continuous study of foreign languages is the first obligation of students of comparative education.

The second tenet of the discipline bids one to distinguish between visitation and research. Numerous field research studies of various American school systems are now available. A glance at these testifies to the complexity and ingenuity that went into their preparation. The deep familiarity with historical and cultural sources, developed sociological method, follow up of the current literature and press, and numerous interviews and visitations go to the making of a reputable school survey. A gilded tour of the art room, the cafeteria and the library is hardly an adequate substitute. Thus visitors to foreign school systems would do well to refrain from formulating overall generalizations. They should, instead, concentrate on presenting eyewitness point by point accounts which will be respected as vital primary sources by more specialized scholars.

G. Z. F. B.

# NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION IN ASIA

NICHOLAS HANS

The importance of nationalism in education, both in administration and curriculum, is at present generally accepted in spite of some skeptical remarks. However, the term itself is rather vaguely used and should be clearly defined in its meaning and limitations. Very often the terms "nationality," "nation," and "state" (not in the American sense) are used as denoting identical social formations. In consequence "nationalism" may be taken as expressing the consciousness of belonging to the same "nationality" or the same "nation" and state. Yet these terms are not identical and therefore the use of "nationalism" in relation to any of them may connote different social phenomena.

Nationality is an ethnic social grouping speaking the same language and sharing the same cultural tradition. It is not necessary for such a group to be of the same racial origin (in the biological sense), but as a rule it is derived from the same stock, which may be a stabilized racial mixture. More often than not a nationality has a dominant religious tradition which helped the members of such a group to integrate their social individuality. Usually a nationality is intimately connected with a specific territory which is known by its name as its historical habitat. Yet "nationality" is not a "nation" or a "state." For instance, Flemings are a "nationality," speaking Flemish and inhabiting Flanders for centuries. But they are neither a "nation" nor a "state." On the other hand Belgians (Flemings and

Walloons) are a "nation" and Belgium is a "state." Historically, each established nationality aspired to the status of a "nation" or an autonomous unit within a "nation," as the Catalans in Spain. When a nationality develops its linguistic or regional "nationalism" it seldom transcends its ethnic community or its historical territory. To claim other linguistic groups or adjacent territory the nationality has to develop into a nation and has to form a state. A "nation" therefore is a higher social formation, which may include several nationalities (e.g., Switzerland has four), may have two or more "national" languages and whose territory is a result of historical events and sometimes sheer accidents. Whereas members of an ethnic nationality are born into it and inherit its language and cultural traditions as their patrimony, members of a nation may come from different countries and be incorporated into the nation, as the American immigrants are. Usually a nation is formally and legally represented in a state, but sometimes a nation may be partitioned among several states as the Polish nation was in the 19th century. It is clear from the above that nationalism of a nationality is different from that of a nation or a state. Only at this higher stage of social integration nationalism may develop into an aggressive movement demanding incorporation of adjacent nationalities and territory. Such demands maybe based on supposed identical racial origin or on similarity of languages, on identity of religion,

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or simply on the reasons of strategical security and economic unity. It is evident that in both cases of nationalism its aims would be reflected in the organization of education and the accepted curriculum. A nationality struggling for recognition would demand instruction in its linguistic idiom, would demand separate schools and inspection and also incorporation into its curriculum of special subjects pertaining to its cultural tradition. If that nationality has been historically connected with particular religious traditions it will also demand denominational schools publicly maintained. In case of "nations" which are mostly plural societies, such a monolithic educational system is hardly possible. Due regard should be given to the variety of religious traditions, to local linguistic differences or to historical regional associations. If a nation is legally organized as a state, then the state legislation may impose one language as "national," may introduce a neutral secular school system and may centralize the administration and the curriculum in order to integrate separate parts into one nation without local differences. Yet if such legislation runs contrary to the "nationalism" of incorporated nationalities it may result in revolution and dissolution of the overriding nation. In the present period of transition it often happened that new states were formed without having a "nation" as a basis and consequently all their efforts were and are directed towards creation of such "nations." Unconsciously they aim at forming an ideal "nation."

I have previously mentioned (see my *Comparative Education*) the five factors of such an "ideal" nation: 1) Unity of race; 2) Unity of language; 3) Unity of religion; 4) Unity of territory; and 5) Political independence. The first factor comes to the fore only in exceptional cases when racial differences are clearly visible to the naked eye (Union of South Africa or Malay Federation). Nazi Germany is not a suitable example as the "racial" policy was specially

invented for political and economic reasons. The second factor, unity of language, is realized only in old nation-states of Europe or in Japan in Asia. Even in Europe unity of language was often the result of conscious policy of the state as in France or Italy. The third factor, unity of religion, in our secular age is seldom enforced and is important in cases when other unifying factors are absent, as for instance Islam in Pakistan. Unity of territory, the fourth factor, is at present so mixed up with other factors that it is usually demanded for strategical and economic reasons. It is in fact a demand for political independence and economic self-sufficiency which is the fifth factor. It is interesting to note that although national movements in different countries vary to a great extent they all depend in the last resort on the notion of an "ideal nation." In those countries where races are visibly distinguishable the policy attempts to preserve the racial "purity" by segregation of schools. In those countries where languages are many the policy is to introduce a "national" idiom and to regain or to create a linguistic unity. Where territory is faultily defined the policy is directed to the acquisition of "Lebensraum" or new frontiers. Finally, in those countries where foreign powers exercised control all emphasis is laid on political independence and economic self-sufficiency. Only in the case of religious plurality does the state policy tend to impose a secular solution without insisting on religious conformity.

History of nationalism runs on the lines of this analysis. Modern nationalism is of comparatively recent origin. The ancient world and the Middle Ages knew religious movements which sometimes coincided with national communities, as the Jewish insurrection against the Roman Empire or the Arab-Islamic expansion. We can call them the precursors of modern nationalism, but they were not the original sources of contemporary ideology. It was started only in the 18th century with the revival of lin-

guistic-cultural identity among smaller nationalities submerged in larger states. The Basques in Spain, the Czechs and Hungarians in the Hapsburg Empire, the Italians in Austria, all became conscious of their separate traditions and started revival movements directed mainly to the study of their languages and cultures. These revivals were still on the level of "nationality," as the idea of a "nation" was novel and was to be ushered on the scene only by the two revolutions—American and French. By separating from Britain the Americans were the first to claim to be a "nation" with a national right for separate political life and separate national culture. They even debated whether the adoption of English as the "national" language would answer the purpose, and discussed the possibility of German or Hebrew as the official language of the new U.S.A. Yet English was accepted by the majority vote of one and thus became the strongest factor in moulding heterogeneous groups of immigrants into one nation. The French revolution, by abolishing old provinces and by prohibiting the use of dialects in schools, created a united French nation and promoted the stabilization of French as the school language throughout France. In Germany, the reaction against Napoleonic conquests and imposition of the French language and legislation was started by Fichte's famous *Reden an die deutsche Nation*. It was still on the level of nationality, as Fichte did not demand a "national" German state embodying a separate German "nation." The "Speeches" emphasized linguistic and cultural unity of German-speaking communities and advocated a "national" system of education to promote it. But as Fichte at the same time advocated a national economic self-sufficiency, his brand of nationalism foreshadowed contemporary movements. However, neither Fichte, nor Mazzini, nor Palacky developed that aggressive and exclusive nationalism which came to power with the advent of Fascism and

Nazism. They all were prophets of international federations with full recognition of rival or complementary nationalisms of adjacent nationalities. It was the defeat of the revolt of nationalities in 1848, with the consequent Hapsburg policy of *divide et impera*, which resulted in an exacerbated nationalism, with all its hatreds and narrow indoctrination. When the European movement of nationalism transcended the confines of Europe and spread to Asia and Africa, these features of the later stages of nationalism influenced the new adepts in their politics and education.

#### *Nationalism in Islamic countries of the Middle East*

In this part of the world nationalism was not a straightforward growth, as in most European countries. The heterogeneous population, with a rich cultural background, was at first integrated by the new religion of Islam and by super-imposition of the Arabic language, and later by the Turkish conquest and the foundation of original national groupings. The factor of unity was super-racial and super-national. Therefore it was natural that the first attempt at regaining cultural independence from European control and influence was diverted into religious channels. Pan-Islamism thus was the first movement resembling modern nationalism. Promoted by Djemal-ed-Din el Afghani for cultural reasons and by Sultan Abdul Hamid for political consolidation of his Empire, pan-Islamism proved to be a failure. Islam was (and is) as hopelessly divided between the warring sections of Sunnis and Shiites as is Western Christianity between Catholics and Protestants. Whilst the pan-Islamic movement was controlled by Sunnis, it would hardly appeal to the Shiite Persians and a considerable group of Arabs. Consequently, the movement for indigenous culture was redirected to pan-turanism in Turkey and pan-arabism in Arab lands, and had only indirect connection with Islam.

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**Turkey.**—Pan-turanism, invented by Young Turks after their policy of secular Ottomanism was wrecked by the opposition of both Turks and Christian minorities, was also a failure. Pan-turanism was not a practical proposition due to geographical separation of various branches of Turkish-speaking peoples surrounded by large nations like Russians and Persians. In consequence, Ata-Turk had to resort to limited Turkish nationalism within the borders of Anatolia and some small territory in Europe around Istanbul. There was scarce background for this new nationalism. The Anatolian and European Turks are half European by blood, have no national Turanian culture, and their language was a peasant speech hardly suitable for modern technological needs. Their culture was Islamic-Arabic, their historical tradition was based on the Sultanate and the Caliphate, and the official Arabic script and Koranic texts were incomprehensible to the Turkish masses. In order to succeed Ata-Turk had to create the modern Turkish language and literature, had to invent Turkish history divorced from Islam and the traditions of the Ottoman Empire, and had to introduce the Latin alphabet and Swiss civil code from Europe. Such a radical change could be effected only through universal education administered and strictly controlled from the centre, and made compulsory by an authoritarian government. All these measures were duly introduced and implemented, but the success of this secular attempt of creating a new Turkish nation seems to be only partial. In spite of legal prohibition of religious teaching in the schools, the influence of Islam proved to be lasting. In 1947, the religious Moslem instruction was reintroduced with a legal fiction of voluntary decision by the parents. On the other hand, after 35 years of national indoctrination, the new generation is certainly permeated with the consciousness of their Turkish identity and nationalist sentiments have come to the fore.

**Arab Lands.**—The Arab Empire of the Baghdad Caliphs was a super-racial and international state united by Islam and the Arabic language. Nationalism in the modern meaning was hardly possible when subjects of the state included Asians, Europeans, and Africans, Semites, Caucasians and Mongols, and old nationalities such as Persians, Syrians and Egyptians. Two events have broken this unstable unity based on religion and official language. The revival of Persian culture connected with the religious schism of the Shiites undermined the monopoly of Arabic, and the invasion of the Turks relegated the ruling Arabs to the status of a subject people. These two events, by separating the Arabs from other Moslem nationalities, concentrated their attention on linguistic-cultural heritage and resulted in the growth of Arab national consciousness. Yet it took a long time to transform the linguistic-cultural tradition into the passionate Arab nationalism of our time. The Turkish rule was Moslem and the Turkish administration was not culturally aggressive and practically left the Arabs to themselves. It was the penetration of the European influence and the example of European nationalism which aroused Arabs from their passivity under the Turks. All the pioneers of Arab nationalism were trained in Europe, mostly in French universities. The Christian Maronites of Lebanon, protected by France, were the first to found Arabic schools and newspapers, based not on Islam, but on cultural heritage. Arab students in Paris started joining French masonic lodges and deplored the religious feuds between Christian, Sunni, and Shiite Arabs. Nagil Azouri, the editor of *Reveil de la Nation Arabe* (Paris, 1905), founded a lodge in Cairo with the aim of Arab independence. The Pan-Arab ideal was accepted by Egyptian, Syrian, and Mesopotamian Arabs as a non-denominational national unity. It could not be accepted by Saudi Arabs, or the puritanical Wahabis, who wanted the reestablishment

of original Islam independent of the Western influences. The Great Powers, by dividing into separate countries the Arab lands liberated from the Turkish dominion, gave rise to two contrary movements of nationalism. Original pan-arabic nationalism was strengthened by general resentment of Arabs against such a division imposed on them and particularly by establishing a Jewish enclave in their midst. On the other hand, economic and local interests fostered by European control created many regional nationalisms and rivalry among the Arabs themselves. This rivalry was inherited by new states after attaining their political independence. Thus Arab nationalism recently resulted in the formation of three camps: The United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, with the doubtful adhesion of Yemen; the shortlived Federation of Jordan and Iraq; and the separate identity of Saudi Arabia, suddenly grown rich by revenue from Aramco. In education this unity and division of Arab nationalism is faithfully reflected. The common factors of the classical Arabic of the Koran and the heritage of Arab history and culture form the basis of curricula in all Arab lands and tend to promote pan-arabic nationalism. But local histories, particularly in Egypt, local geography and economies, are emphasized and create local nationalism and regional rivalry. Which tendency will be uppermost in nationalist training of the Arab youth will largely depend on the policy of Western powers.

#### *India and Southeast Asia*

It is impossible to discuss all Asiatic countries in this article. We omit the old Far-Eastern countries of China, Japan, and Korea, because their national and educational problems are too complex to be dealt with here. We also reluctantly exclude Burma, Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines for lack of space. The selected countries represent two groups: India, Pakistan, and Ceylon; and the Malayan Federation

and Indonesia. The first group are the members of the British Commonwealth and share a common historical past and a long period of British influence. The second group, although British and Dutch in the past, share a similarity of populations and of dominant Islamic traditions. All these countries have attained political independence after the second world war, and all have formed their own states with separate constitutions and legislatures. Their cases resemble the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had a highly developed state structure, but had no "imperial" nation as basis. But whilst Austria-Hungary had the dynasty of Hapsburgs accepted for centuries by all nationalities of the Empire, and a common cultural tradition based on medieval Latin and the Catholic religion, the new Asiatic states were integrated into a semblance of "nations" by foreign rule and foreign linguistic-cultural influence. The comparatively recent nationalism in these countries thus was largely a negative movement directed against foreign domination, but was neither a positive nationalism of a single nationality nor the expression of identity of a new "nation." Nationwide languages were and are non-existent and had to be created as the highly developed languages of many nationalities are unacceptable to new "nations." Religious uniformity is only comparative and the new "nations" include large minorities of different religious tradition. Racial unity does not exist either and various stocks are visibly differentiated in spite of the intermediate types. Even the unity of territory cannot be taken for granted, as the maps of Pakistan and Indonesia clearly demonstrate. In these circumstances "nationalism" of these countries seems to hang in the air and is countered by more integrated, but narrow, nationalism of regional and linguistic-cultural groups. Unless a national language is created and accepted by all groups, a mere state legal structure will remain an artificial form lacking vital content, and

may result in a fate similar to Austria-Hungary. The resulting difficulties in building up a national system of education are similar in all these countries.

*Indian Union.*—Before independence, nationalism in India was divided on religious grounds, and Moslems and Hindus could agree only on their common desire of being set free from British domination. After the departure of the British and the division of the peninsula into the Indian Union and Pakistan, one third of all Moslems remained within the Union and the new state could not declare Hinduism a national religion in face of the presence of about forty million Moslems and millions of Christians, Sikhs, and smaller religious communities. The new Indian nationalism also could not be based on language or on race as the population, not homogeneous, included 17 major languages and hundreds of dialects. In racial origin it represented all possible variations of color and ethnic type. It was a case of a legal state being created before a nation had been formed. Indian education thus is confronted with a formidable task of integrating various communities into a nation. A national language is the first condition for the success of such a policy. The British have started the process of integration, but could not complete it by employing English as the language of the Empire. The old Imperial language, although spoken by all the academically educated Indians, is a reminder of foreign rule and is entirely unknown to the masses. However useful English may be for academic and commercial purposes, it could never be accepted as the literary national language of India. Although there are some advocates of such a solution, very flattering to England, it is as utopian as making Esperanto international idiom. But whatever language be chosen, it would be spoken only by a minority of the enormous Indian population. In this predicament the government chose Hindi as the national language because it is spoken by a relative majority of 140 million

Indians out of 400 million. To realize this aim a universal system of education, with compulsory study of Hindi, is necessary. With incessant rapid growth of the Indian population, universal education is impossible for decades and English will be used in the universities and trade for a longer period than it was thought at first. But if the Indians want to form a single nation and not to be split into Bengali, Mahratta, Tamil, and other nations, the adoption of Hindi is a step in the right direction. At present the provincial governments start primary education in regional languages, then teach Hindi as the second language, and on the university level still use English to a great extent. Meanwhile, by necessity, the Indian government is attempting the creation of a nation by social-economic measures of a welfare state. Communications, finance, and industrial development will provide the framework, but it must be filled by linguistic-cultural content so as not to follow the example of Austria-Hungary. The industrialization and mechanization of agriculture, necessary for raising the standard of living, has confronted the government with an additional task of training the technical cadres, which again raises the problem of a national language. Whilst building up nationalism of a "nation-state," the government has to take into account the existing nationalism of various regions with sometimes conflicting aims. The presence of nationalisms of nationalities, with their historical territories and separate languages, is an established fact, whereas the all-Indian nationalism is still in process of formation. In order to succeed, the educational policy has to synthesize these two kinds of nationalism into one. That is the main problem of India.

*Pakistan.*—Pakistanis are neither a race, nor a linguistic community, nor have they a clearly defined territory. From the start it was a religious movement of a Moslem minority in British India. Consequently, only those parts of India which had a Mos-



lem majority could join the new state. As a result, West Pakistan is separated from East Pakistan by the breadth of Indian territory and millions of Moslems are left within the Indian Union. Racial and linguistic affinities were disregarded, and the only deciding factor was the adherence to Islam. Whether religion can mould heterogeneous groups into a new "nation" remains to be seen. The failure of pan-islamism in the Middle East is rather a discouraging example. As it is, the legal imposition of Urdu as a national language met with strong resistance in East Pakistan and the government was obliged to recognize Bengali as the second "national" language. As a matter of fact Bengali is a recognized language in the Indian Union and is used in the University of Calcutta within the Union. This concession to the 40 million Bengali-speaking Pakistanis has not solved the problem of national language. Urdu is not spoken by people even in West Pakistan, and they demand schools in their local idioms (Punjabi, Sindhi, and Pushtu), which are spoken also by their neighbors beyond the frontiers of West Pakistan. Islam is certainly more than a dynamic religion, and includes legal and moral doctrines which, in contemporary philosophic interpretation, may be adapted to modern needs. Whether the modern interpretation of Islam by Pakistani leaders, educated in the liberal atmosphere of English-speaking universities, would be acceptable to illiterate orthodox peasantry, is still a question mark. Moreover, in our secular age the winds blowing from Soviet Central Asia in time may disrupt the faith in the Arabic Koran.

*Ceylon.*—Ceylon is another case of a plural community. There are two main groups: the Sinhalese-speaking majority, mostly Buddhist, and the Tamil-speaking minority, mostly Hindus, but including a group of Moslem-Moors. The two languages have little in common, as the Sinhalese is a derivative of Sanskrit, and Tamil

is a Dravidian language. In addition, the two groups are visibly distinguishable, as the Tamils are darker than the Sinhalese. The problem of building up a single Ceylonese nation is complicated by the presence of Indian Tamils in large numbers who are not recognized as citizens by the government, but whose labor on the plantations is necessary for Ceylon's economy. The Ceylonese Tamils live in the north, where they had their historical kingdoms and where they have developed their own culture and literature. The Indian Tamils live among the Sinhalese and are mostly illiterate. The Sinhalese majority of 65 per cent want a single Ceylonese nation, and for this purpose recognized their language as the "national" idiom, compulsory for all Ceylon citizens. The Tamils hotly dispute this law, and demand legal equality of both languages, a separate school system in Tamil, and territorial autonomy in their historical *habitat*. The religious difference further complicates the problem, as the Buddhist monks demand the legal recognition of Buddhism as the "national" religion. Thus, two linguistic-religious nationalisms oppose each other and refuse to sink their differences in a wider nationalism embracing them both. The tension leads to clashes and riots and is reflected in the schools. The compromise between two national communities would be possible if moderation would be shown by both sides. Such a compromise is imperative on economic and political grounds, and would lead to general progress for both communities. The legal segregation of two groups into two separate political units would only impoverish both and would not provide a final solution.

*Indonesia.*—On the surface, the Republic of Indonesia presents a "national" community of the same racial origin, the same religion (Islam), and similar languages of Malay roots. Yet there is an inner tension between regions and separate islands, and the recent events made manifest the absence of a united nation. As in India, the "na-

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tional" movement was the result of European (in this case Dutch) occupation and centralized administration. Various tribes, with their own dialects and regional rivalries, were united by foreign rule and developed a negative kind of "nationalism" directed against the Dutch. As elsewhere in former European colonies, the attainment of independence brought to the surface the hidden inner tensions and made it clear that the Indonesian "nation" so far does not exist and has to be created. Malay was adopted as a national language by the government for that purpose. Yet Malay is not spoken by the tribes of Indonesia and was imported from British Malaya, where it was used in public schools. As a language of secondary and university level, Malay is still in process of formation. The school system in Malay is almost as foreign to Indonesian tribes as was the old Dutch system. It will take decades until universal compulsory education will make the new idiom into the "national" language of Indonesia. As to the religious tradition of Islam, which is common to the masses, the leaders of the new state, in distinction to Pakistanis, are secularists and definitely refuse to make it the foundation of their "nationalism."

*Malay Federation.*—The Malay Federation is a plural community, including 40 per cent Malays, 40 per cent Chinese, and 20 per cent all others, mostly Indian Tamils. Singapore, which is intimately connected with Malaya, although excluded from the Federation, is practically a Chinese city, with 800,000 Chinese and 200,000 other inhabitants. If Singapore be added to Malaya, the Chinese would have a clear majority. The three main communities of Malays, Chinese and Indians are distinct in race, language, religion, culture, and even in citizenship. Many Chinese and Indians are recent immigrants still loyal to their own countries. In these circumstances, "nationalism" is limited to the three separate "nationalities," and has little chance of growing into a national movement embracing

the whole population. As a matter of fact, the "nationalism" of the native Malays is directed against the Chinese and Indian immigrants, who cling to their own brands of "nationalism" inspired outside Malaya. The only common factors are the language of the administration (English) and the English schools open to all. Otherwise, the public Malay schools are for the Malays only, and the private Chinese schools for the Chinese. Although the English secondary schools and the University of Malaya in Singapore are attended by all three "nationalities," it is hardly probable that English may develop into the "national" language of Malaya. The 500 million Chinese in China are too near on the horizon to expect the Chinese settlers to develop a "Malayan" attitude independent of pressures from China. It is only the British connection which keeps the Malayan Federation as an independent country against a possible Chinese mass immigration.

### Conclusion

In this short article we could not discuss the impact of nationalism in all the Asiatic countries. In the countries surveyed here we observe the following common features: 1) The new countries (Turkey excepted) are the result of European administrations which unified different communities into "nations," in the artificial frontiers of former colonies or protectorates; 2) Cultural-linguistic communities existed before the Europeans took control and have given rise to regional "nationalisms" with conflicting aims; 3) The attainment of independence confronted the new states with a task of creating new "nations;" 4) The absence of "national" languages acceptable to all groups resulted in the formation of new languages adapted to technological purposes, but only slightly connected with the "mother tongue" of the masses; 5) Educational problems in consequence are highly complex and pull the governments in op-

posite directions. The illiterate masses have to be educated (in their mother tongue) to be able to form a common tradition as a basis for a new "nation." On the other hand, technical development demands new cadres of technicians able to understand scientific terminology absent in local languages or dialects. The problem of the medium of instruction thus is in the forefront of educational difficulties. Besides, the financial burdens entailed in simultaneous realization of mass education and training of cadres

surpass the capacities of the new countries and depend largely on foreign capital invested in new industries. In Soviet Russia and Turkey, more or less adequate solutions were possible through the monopoly of totalitarian regimes. The new countries, having imbibed the liberal traditions of Western democracies, are reluctant to employ such totalitarian methods. The question inevitably arises whether such kinds of democracy and tolerance can be applied to illiterate and fanatical populations of Asia,

## SOVIET PEDAGOGICAL ACADEMY AND THE NEW SCHOOL PLANS

WILLIAM K. MEDLIN

Leading educators in the USSR unveiled late last winter some details of plans which are making and will continue to make radical changes in Russian schools. Some of these schools have been under close study and constant experimentation. Considerable interest attaches not only to the character of these changes, but also to the agencies that mold them. Soviet school programs and experiments during the past decade or so have derived much of their shape and character from intensive research and academic deliberations. The principal forum where this work and its results are reviewed and reported on is the annual general meeting of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR), a higher institution for training and research. Since its creation late in 1943, the Academy has become a fundamental formulator of Soviet educational plans and pedagogical methods. Its role and activities, at least until recent years, have not been made well known outside the Soviet Union.

Established by direction of a decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (Ministers) on October 6, 1943, the Academy enjoys a quasi-official status in the Soviet governmental framework.<sup>1</sup> Administratively it is subordinated to the RSFSR Ministry of Education. This status has over the years provided for a close relationship between the Academy and the Soviet government. For example, the President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, I. A. Kairov, served concurrently for many years as the RSFSR Minister of Education. The new First Assistant Minister of Education, A. I. Markushevich, who recently replaced Madame Liudmila V. Dubrovina in that post, has for some years been a vice president of the Academy.

The Academy's membership is highly selective, normally consisting only of "outstanding" educators and educational researchers who are elected either to active (full) membership or to corresponding membership.<sup>2</sup> Through its various pro-

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grams and scientific sessions, the Academy assists in informing the general public and school personnel about educational developments, conducts special research and experimentation in pedagogy and educational psychology, and operates graduate teacher-training programs. A number of institutions under the Academy, like the Institute of the Theory and History of Pedagogy, the Institute of Teaching Methods, and the Scientific Research Institute of Defectology, are equipped to carry on research and graduate training. The work done in these establishments is considered to be of high calibre, although observers have noted some theoretical limitations.<sup>3</sup>

At the February 1958 General Meeting of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences major problems and interests of Soviet educators were elaborated in considerable detail.<sup>4</sup> Among the leading participants at the gathering were Mr. E. I. Afanasenko (RSFSR Minister of Education), Academician I. A. Kairov, and Academician N. K. Goncharov. The meeting reflected much concern for curricular and grade (class) structures at various levels in the general educational program, and pointed out the apparent need for greater emphasis on moral and esthetic values in both teaching methods and course content. A brief account of the various questions that were discussed can be best presented under appropriate topical headings.

#### *Revised Programs in the 10-year School*

Reforms in the 10-year school, called for by the 1956 (and also the 1952) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, aim to give Soviet youth more practical knowledge and training useful for living in the changing economic and social conditions of the USSR. The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences has been working out a program which includes both the heavy, foundational courses of general education, which have been characteristic of the program since the mid-1930's, and a poly-

technical (industrial and agricultural arts) program obligatory for all students. The general meeting announced that a new study plan and new course programs, devised by the Academy's Institute of Teaching Methods, had been introduced into 585 Russian 10-year schools during the 1956-57 school year.<sup>5</sup> In 1957-58, the RSFSR Ministry of Education introduced the new program in 25 per cent of its schools.<sup>6</sup> A more radical experimental program is the one tried in 50 Russian schools under the Academy's supervision, where in grades 9 and 10 and the new grade 11 the pupils divide their school week into two equal parts: 3 days of academic work (including both general and polytechnical courses), and 3 days in actual production work outside the school. The experiment has shown that, in order to cover the required academic subjects in addition to the new practical work, students enrolled in this program will be required to prolong their period of study by 2-3 years. But this may now be modified by the proposals currently under discussion to limit secondary schools for all to 8 years.

#### *Innovations in the Primary School Curriculum*

The Academy states that more developmental instruction is needed in the programs of the early grades in order to help prepare pupils for polytechnical studies and exercises which increase in the upper grades. With this end in mind, the school authorities altered the 1957-58 programs in the Russian language and in arithmetic so as to provide for more practical exercises. Among the changes reported are new elements in reading matter: terms descriptive of the natural environs and of how people live have been introduced. The aim is to activate development of the child's speech and thought with such concepts and so to influence "in a positive way" his general educational development.

#### *School for 6-year Olds*

In 1957 the Academy continued to experi-

ment with the teaching of reading, writing and counting to 6-year old pupils. Children in the upper age brackets of kindergardens and in certain preparatory classes (prior to grade one) performed well. The results were sufficiently good so that the same experiments were continued and expanded by the Academy during the 1957-58 school year.

#### *Teaching Methods and Moral Instruction*

Research done by the Academy's Institute of the Theory and History of Pedagogy has brought new attention to the teaching of moral values and to methods of educating the personality. Particular focus fell on problems of the child's independence and initiative, group relations, and inculcating a sense of responsibility to learning. A study edited by N. K. Boldyrev, *Group Organization of Pupils (Organizatsiia uchenicheskogo kollektiva)* particularly investigates the relations between the individual pupil and the class group. One of the observations emerging from the study is that "the group's influence on forming the personality of the school child" can be an aid in arranging group activities. The Institute of Psychology is preparing studies on the role of motivation in children's social behavior during the performance of their academic and work assignments.

Somewhat similarly a plea was made by Academician D. D. Blagoi not to sacrifice elements of literature courses for other elements of the general program. He pointed out that Russian literature is now studied in the 10-year program only from 1812, and that many important authors are not even touched upon. It should be remembered, said Blagoi, "that we are not training intelligent calculating machines, but a roundly developed human being, being with a capital letter, which is what every citizen of the future communist society must become."<sup>7</sup>

This brief resume of the proceedings of the February 1958 General Meeting of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences points up an important feature of Soviet

education at this juncture: it is moving through a period of dynamic and determined changes. These changes respond to new and shifting requirements in the cultural, social, and economic framework of the Soviet Union. At a time when much discussion about education in the United States has diverted attention to the reportedly effective Soviet school system, that system itself is in transition. The information from the Academy helps us to understand the direction in which Soviet educators are moving.

#### REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> Students interested in the Academy's charter may consult *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, No. 7 (July), 1944, pp. 1 ff.
- <sup>2</sup> *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 582.
- <sup>3</sup> A delegation from the U. S. Office of Education was impressed with the competence of some workers in the Academy during its visits there in the spring of 1958. In regard to other impressions, see W. W. Brickman, "The Training of Soviet Teachers," in *America*, Vol. 99, No. 7, May 17, 1958, pp. 218-221.
- <sup>4</sup> *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, No. 4 (April), 1958, pp. 136-146.
- <sup>5</sup> Study plan changes brought an increase of polytechnical courses by 1 hour per week in grades 3-4; 1 hour per week in grade 8; and 2 hours per week in grades 9-10. Other changes were: a reduction in Russian language and literature of 1 hour during the first half of grade 8; a reduction in mathematics of 1 hour during the last half of grade 10; a reduction in history of 1 hour during the last half of grade 8 and the first half of grade 9, but with an increase of 1 hour during the last half of grade 10; an increase in physics of 1 hour during grades 7-8, but with a decrease of 1 hour during the last half of grade 9 and the first half of grade 10; and an increase in physical education of 1 hour in grades 8-10. Source: Glavnoe upravlenie shkol Ministerstva Prosveshcheniia RSFSR. *Uchebnyi plan nachal'noi, semiletnei i srednei shkoly dlia opytnoi proverki v 1957-58 uchebnom godu* (1957), looseleaf, 2 pp. For the old study plan, see U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, *Education in the USSR* (Washington, 1957) pp. 68-73.
- <sup>6</sup> In the current year this proportion has been raised to 50 per cent.
- <sup>7</sup> *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, No. 4 (April), 1958, p. 143.

## SOCIAL DYSFUNCTIONS OF INDONESIAN EDUCATION

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF

While the rate of its growth in the last decade has indeed been spectacular, Indonesia's educational establishment is also creating a pattern of dangerous social stresses and disjunctions, which is in many ways similar to that encountered in other underdeveloped countries recently emancipated from colonial rule.

In keeping with the injunction (article 30, sub. 1) of the provisional Indonesian constitution that "Every citizen is entitled to receive an education," educational facilities have enormously expanded: between 1940—during the colonial era—and 1955, the number of primary schools increased from 18,091 to 29,629, and the number of primary teachers and pupils grew respectively from 40,583 to 104,214 and from 2.02 million to 6.31 million; the number of secondary schools jumped from 144, with 1,607 teachers and 26,535 students in 1940, to 1,525, with 7,810 teachers and 385,365 students in 1955, while colleges and universities grew from 5, with 149 teachers and 1,693 students in 1940, to 23, with 1,159 teachers and more than 19,000 students in 1955. In addition, the type of schools has become more diversified, offering wider opportunities for vocational and technical specialization. This rapid development must be viewed first of all as a conscious reaction on the part of the Indonesian people and the state to the barriers to popular education existing in the colonial period which left, as late as 1930, more than 94% of all Indonesians illiterate, imposed a rigid Dutch-oriented curriculum out of touch with de-

veloping Indonesian needs, and tended to be highly discriminatory, often favoring the traditional Indonesian aristocracy over the common man. Today education is widely viewed as the "open sesame" to improved status, and as the means par excellence to satisfy heightened social and material expectations brought about by the successful overthrow of colonial rule.<sup>1</sup>

An example of the preponderant role assigned education in the Indonesian's life at present is the society of the Toba-Bataks, an important ethnic group in Central-East Sumatra. Barred from sending their children in great numbers to the government schools during the colonial period, which favored the education of the scions of the traditional aristocracy, the Toba-Bataks since the Indonesian revolution have flooded the schools, looking upon education as an important accelerator of those processes of social, geographical and job mobility which have long been underway in their society. Although schooling beyond the primary level is very expensive, yet, as one student has put it:

The startling fact throughout the area is that, in spite of the pressure, parents are determined to provide this education for their children although it means great sacrifice . . . ministers told me that some parents are underfed because their children go to school. I saw many cases where parents lived on almost nothing in order to provide at least one child with education.<sup>2</sup>

It is likely that the Toba-Batak's demand for education was shaped earlier by the emancipating influences of Christian mis-



sionary activity and by a tradition of socioeconomic individualism in his society,<sup>3</sup> yet his attitude may be regarded as typical for all of Indonesia today.

Parental sacrifice on behalf of the schooling of the young is, however, clearly viewed as a family investment in the future: upon completion of its education and entry into comparatively rewarding social status and employment, the child is expected to take care of its relatives and improve their position in life as well. One astute student of recent changes in Balinese culture points out, for example, that the drive for education in Bali is to a very great degree exerted by parental interest in family advancement. The Balinese father, typically, "is not interested in what his boy studies, so long as he becomes an official as quickly as possible. Out of the salary he then will be earning one expects that he will help all his other relatives, open his house to them, take in his younger brothers and sisters to educate them, and use his full influence to help them in getting jobs."<sup>4</sup> In most cases such assistance—with its tendency toward nepotism—will be regarded as self-explanatory, since family solidarity is highly developed among the Balinese, as indeed it is among other Indonesian groups.<sup>5</sup>

It is here that we begin to touch on a principal source of social unbalance engendered by Indonesia's educational system. For the schooling that is sought, especially in the secondary curricula, is principally of a traditional, academic nature that qualifies for administrative and bureaucratic positions, while training geared to Indonesia's peasant economy and to its slowly developing but so highly essential commercial-industrial establishment is relegated to a far less desirable place in popular thinking. The reasons for this lie first in the traditional value constellation of many Indonesians which, as in other underdeveloped areas,<sup>6</sup> tends to depreciate manual productive labor or mechanical-technical employment, and reverses the status of the bureaucrat, literatus

or cleric (the *pudjangga*, as he is called in Javanese court tradition); and, secondly, in the persisting influence of the colonial educational system which tended to underemphasize technical-vocational schooling and stressed the academic curriculum as the only path to social advancement via government functions. Again and again foreign observers, highly sympathetic to Indonesia's interests, point to popular ambition toward the status of a *pudjangga* in modern dress, and to the "brief-case fixation" of Indonesian students: too many secondary school graduates strive after a lawyer's or official's career, too few after the technical professions like those of agronomist or engineer.<sup>7</sup> The curriculum itself, in the opinion of others, is too much concerned with a thoughtless "acquisition of abstract knowledge" and "far too little with the practical needs of the population of the villages,"<sup>8</sup> where, after all, 70 per cent of all Indonesians still live.

One consequence of this tendency is a "drainage" of the rural areas of its best minds and an overconcentration of a clerical or lower bureaucratic proletariat in the larger cities where opportunities for employment can hardly keep pace with white collar job applicants. A recent survey<sup>9</sup> of immigration into the city of Djakarta showed that for many the main reason for their moving to the capital was the schooling offered there. A related example is offered by the Toradja, who inhabit the Central Celebes. Also because of missionary activity in their society the Toradja were well supplied with schools and in fact became quite "school minded." But graduation of a student is a net loss for Toradja society; the graduate neither can nor wants to make a living in the simple folk argrarian society of his fathers, and he migrates in droves to the south, to the city of Makassar, there to look for clerical or bureaucratic employment.<sup>10</sup> The social havoc which the present educational system wreaks in parts of Indonesia today is perhaps illustrated best



by the island of Flores in Eastern Indonesia. Since independence there has been an enormous "run" on the primary and academic secondary schools of the island; indeed, fully half of the island's budget goes for salaries of teachers. But education is robbing Flores' economy of the dynamics of growth. On the island "the offices are filled to overflowing," industry, commerce and fishing need to be developed, and agriculture alone offers significant challenge and opportunity. But neither the nature of the schooling on Flores, nor the employment wishes of the students (and of their parents!) go in the direction of an improved peasant economy or of activating the commercial-industrial sector of the island's economy.<sup>11</sup> Flores is poor, and it will remain so until its school system is geared to the potentials of the island's growth. Meanwhile, the result of the present educational system on Flores is predictable: migration to cities beyond the island of the schooled youth, or increased pressure on local and national government for an expansion of bureaucratic employment.

There can be no question that the government bureaucracy has indeed enormously expanded and, in view of Indonesia's stagnating economy, has become a major job objective of those with schooling. In February, 1955, the then Minister of Finance declared in the Indonesian parliament that the number of government officials fluctuated between 900,000 and a million, as compared to 140,000 in the colonial period.<sup>12</sup> Since independence was achieved, salary costs of government officials, in percentages of the total national budget, have increased sharply (from 21.3% in 1952 to 34% in 1956).<sup>13</sup> Today, as one student has put it, "the bureaucracy and the educational system (also enormously expanded) are locked in a self-perpetuating circle of distension in which the second produces more and more diplomaed graduates which the latter is forced to absorb."<sup>14</sup> Even if one is willing to account for a large part of the expansion

of the bureaucracy in terms of the developing services of the Indonesian welfare state, it remains a fact that optimum efficiency in government administrative operations has long since been abandoned in favor of a "featherbedding" process that accommodates a potentially explosive intellectual or semi-intellectual proletariat. The possible tensions that may arise out of heightened personal ambitions shaped by the schools, and the stagnation of an economy that cannot meet these ambitions, have been well indicated in a recent analysis of the Indonesian economy:

... this rising level of education and enlarging intellectual horizon of the man in the street involves sharpening of some contrasts. A young man who has gained some elementary education reads newspapers and is an active member of some youth club, feels strongly the paradox of his existence, if he has to sit idly before a railway station, or at some other public place, waiting for some occasional earning. In the colonial time, when the Dutch policy endeavoured to perpetuate the "dual" structure of society, he might have been happy, provided he had enough to eat. Now, torn from his native *kampung* with its traditional way of life, he expects that the national state will not only provide him an opportunity to earn his living, but also will make his life more purposeful. He is vaguely expecting some social and economic reconstruction to come.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, as in other underdeveloped countries,<sup>16</sup> the future stability of the Indonesian state may well depend on its capacity to absorb increasing numbers in its bureaucratic apparatus.

The scramble for an academic form of secondary education has in large measure come about, so it is said, because this type of schooling was in the colonial period often reserved for the well-to-do and particularly for the sons of the aristocracy. The Indonesian aristocracy in the colonial period was in most cases absorbed in the civil service structure of the government, so that a self-selective mechanism favored those with aristocratic antecedents in a type of schooling that alone gave entry to bureaucratic status. There is considerable

evidence that notwithstanding the democratic influences of the successful revolution against the Dutch and the expansion of the school system itself, this self-selective mechanism in the better academic type of high schools still operates, so that children of government officials make up the far larger proportion of pupils in the academic secondary schools, the traditional training ground for the higher positions in society in general and in the government in particular.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, in response to mounting public pressures for the certified graduate, diploma swindles have become common and degree mills, both at the secondary and higher education levels, have mushroomed. In the absence of a higher education law and of laws governing the plethora of private schools, these manifestations of what one Indonesian educator has called "the diploma cult" in the country are apt to continue. Over the years there has been a steady drift toward lowering of academic standards both in the high schools and the colleges. In the interests of "industrialization" the engineering program has been reduced from 5 to 3½ years, the medical program from 7 to 6 years (this on the dubious grounds that the training program of the physician today goes in a prophylactic rather than in a therapeutic direction).<sup>18</sup> In 1955 the Ministry of Education decided that in the comprehensive high school examinations (required for graduation), every candidate would automatically get a minimum passing grade in mathematics and physics.<sup>19</sup> Despite the opposition from *student groups* protesting this "diploma inflation," which would debase their entire scholastic achievement, the government did not alter its position. And in July, 1958, Professor S. Siswomartono, Dean of the Teachers Training College in Bandung, called for a further revision of the examination system in the country which, he argued, had the tendency to suppress the "natural endowments" of the students. The real purpose of the Dean's proposal (which received pow-

erful support in the Ministry of Education and in the Indonesian parliament) was perhaps best revealed by his incredible comment that "in the Soviet Union and China there are few instances in which students are not promoted or fail in examinations."<sup>20</sup>

A survey of the Indonesian educational system quickly shows the existence of a great many institutions, especially at the secondary level, which offer preparation for the business and technical-vocational world. It is also clear that even with (or perhaps because of) lowered standards these schools are not much sought after by diploma-hungry Indonesians and are frequently viewed as second- or third-rate, ranking far below the prestigious academic schools with their white-collar occupational objectives. The reasons, as have been indicated, lie not only in the Indonesian's traditional view of the educational process, but also in the overall development problem of the country. So long as the Indonesian economy remains essentially stagnant, so long as commercial-entrepreneurial or technical and managerial skills have only limited opportunity to deploy themselves in rewarding fashion, so long will the Indonesian student storm the academic secondary schools. More than a generation ago the director of colonial Indonesia's Department of Education had already touched on this problem:<sup>21</sup>

... it is not possible for technical education immediately to link up with society, as can be done in the West. On the contrary, society will have to develop its trade life, and technical education gives the first impulse in this direction, which is really an unnatural relation that can only gradually be changed. In particular the contempt for manual labor ... even among persons who can do no more than a little reading and writing, must disappear.

But while the slow advance in technical education may gradually give impulses to the undeveloped commercial-industrial sector of the economy, the fact remains that unless such impulses are permitted to make themselves felt their value will remain small.

"Indonesians will need to become more 'development minded' than they now are," as one economist has written,<sup>22</sup> and in the meantime technical education and development in Indonesia abounds in anomalies. For example, for political reasons Indonesians are insisting on the accelerated absorption of Indonesians in the technical and administrative functions of the larger foreign estate and oil enterprises in the country. Many of these enterprises are willing to meet Indonesians more than half way in this so-called "Indonesianization" process. But their experience undoubtedly parallels that of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company—one of the most progressive foreign enterprises in Indonesia—which, though it has "Indonesianized" as much as possible, yet has been forced to increase its American staff of late because "vigorous recruitment efforts in Indonesia have not turned up the needed number of (Indonesian) nationals with requisite educational backgrounds to fill the large number of technical posts."<sup>23</sup>

Thus technical education and technical development are locked in a mutually co-extensive rigidity: expansion of the former is dependent upon accelerating growth in the latter. What gives the relationship between the two its relative frozen immobility is the collectivist orientation in the entire area of Indonesian planning, which has the effect of restricting deployment of individual technological acumen and entrepreneurship and puts the emphasis on the government in all phases of future economic activity. For example, after studying economic conditions in Central Java, including the position of the "national bourgeoisie" of petty entrepreneurs and industrialists, the Economic Section of the Indonesian Parliament recently reported that "in the fields of industry and mining all eyes turn to the Government for participation," and this fact should "become the basis of calculation about further developments in Indonesia."<sup>24</sup> Inasmuch as the Indonesian government is at present unable to provide meaningful im-

pulses to sustained growth because of its own precarious economic position and the political instability that confronts the country, the Indonesian entrepreneur, surrounded by all manner of regulations devised by a collectivistically inclined state, can only sit and wait,—and discourage his son from obtaining such specialized technical or professional training as could launch him on an independent career. An exception may perhaps be made here for a field like medicine, but generally it holds true that even those Indonesians with advanced professional training tend to become government officials, heading the various technical-administrative services of the burgeoning welfare state. For this, if for no other reason, evidences of independent scholarship and research by the Indonesian professional élite must remain scant for the time being.<sup>25</sup>

The extensive range of state power in Indonesia today re-enforces powerful traditions of authoritarianism; indeed, Indonesian leaders have been at pains to join their modern collectivist concepts with the collectivism of the Indonesian past.<sup>26</sup> This means that education as an innovating force must also adapt itself to the prevailing cultural tone in various Indonesian societies. One former Indonesian Minister of Education, contrasting American and Indonesian educational philosophies, has pointed out that while in the U. S. "the pioneer mind searches for new facts, traditions and values, in Indonesia there does not exist such a state of mind."<sup>27</sup> The Indonesian mind is more concerned with a rediscovery and a streamlining of "ancient facts." While this tendency may make for a continuity of cultural values, it can also act as a serious barrier to the intensification of technical and economic change and development which Indonesia so badly requires if it is to feed its growing millions and satisfy their aspirations of national greatness.

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<sup>2</sup> Clark E. Cunningham, *The Postwar Migration of the Toba-Bataks to East Sumatra* (Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1958), p. 69.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. H. van Zanen, *Voorwaarden voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling in het Centrale Batakland* (Dissertation, Leyden, 1934).

<sup>4</sup> Jef Last, *Bali in De Kennering* (Amsterdam, 1955), p. 35.

<sup>5</sup> The question has long been moot whether this highly developed family and ethnic solidarity is a drag on social and economic development in Indonesia. See J. M. van der Kroef, "Economic Development in Indonesia: Some Social and Cultural Impediments," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 4 (1956), pp. 116-133.

<sup>6</sup> An interesting parallel to the Indonesian aversion to manual-technical employment and proclivity toward prestigious bureaucratic and (often non-practicing) professional positions is offered by Latin America. Cf. William S. Stokes, "Economic and Cultural Values in Latin America," in James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck, eds., *Foreign Aid Re-Examined* (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1958).

<sup>7</sup> Jan Romein, *In de Ban van Prambanan. Indonesische Voordrachten en Indrukken* (Amsterdam 1954), p. 175.

<sup>8</sup> Jef Last, *Zo Zag Ik Indonesië* (The Hague, Bandung, 1956), p. 306.

<sup>9</sup> Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, "Urbanisasi Djakarta," *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* (Djakarta), vol. 8 (1955), pp. 107-151.

<sup>10</sup> H. J. Heeren, "De Trek der Toradja's Naar Makassar," p. 61 in G. H. van der Kolff, ed., *Sticusa Jaarboek 1952* (Amsterdam, 1952).

<sup>11</sup> A. van den Ende, "Pengadjaran dan Kebutuhan Masyarakat," *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* vol. 10 (1957), pp. 215-226.

<sup>12</sup> *Java Bode* (Djakarta), February 4, 1955.

<sup>13</sup> *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, vol. 10 (1957), p. 275.

<sup>14</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach* (Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., April, 1956), p. 72 (mimeo).

<sup>15</sup> Stanislas Swianiewicz, "Tendencies to Development and Stagnation in the Indonesian Ec-

onomy," *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, vol. 11 (1958), pp. 97-98.

<sup>16</sup> A parallel to the Indonesian situation is offered by the case of Iran. In Iran "salaries and services account for about 70 percent of the ordinary Government expenditures. That the Government payroll is overloaded with excess employees is generally admitted, but, in the words of one witness 'the problem cannot be met by simply cutting off large numbers of employees to roam the streets and become threats to the stability of the government.'" *United States Aid Operations in Iran. First Report by The Committee on Government Operations, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 28, 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1957), p. 51.

<sup>17</sup> Leslie H. Palmier, "Occupational Distribution of Parents of Pupils in certain Indonesian Educational Institutions," *Indonesië*, vol. 10 (1957), pp. 343, 347. In the light of this preferred position of children of officials in the better schools, the remark of the Indonesian Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, Hutasoit, that "it would be unjust" to provide education to "a group of privileged," strikes one as somewhat incongruous. Cf. *Report on Indonesia*, April, 1956, p. 15.

<sup>18</sup> *Oost en West*, July, 1956, p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, September, 1955, p. 19.

<sup>20</sup> *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, July 17, 1958, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* (Chicago, 1931), vol. 2, p. 238.

<sup>22</sup> Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia's Stabilization and Development* (New York, 1957), p. 125.

<sup>23</sup> *Starvac in Indonesia*. (Sixth Case Study, National Planning Association Series on U. S. Business Performances Abroad, Washington, D. C., 1957), pp. 77-78.

<sup>24</sup> *Antara Daily News Bulletin*, July 22, 1958.

<sup>25</sup> Instructive is the recent apologia of a reviewer of the work of two Indonesian legal scholars (both of them in government service). After noting that the work brings little news and is filled with inaccuracies, the reviewer is at pains to defend the authors against possible criticisms for their shortcomings by stressing the difficult circumstances under which the Indonesian scholar must work, such as "being involved in all sorts of political activities, and all of those receptions and meetings. . . ." *Indonesië*, vol. 9 (1956), pp. 82-84.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (Bandung, Indonesia, 1954-1956), 2 vols., vol. 1, pp. 94-132.

<sup>27</sup> Sarino Manganpranoto (Education Minister, 1956-1957), in *The Asian Student* (San Francisco), February 18, 1958, p. 5.

## EDUCATION FOR THE BANTU: A SOUTH AFRICAN DILEMMA

VICTOR N. LOW

No measure advanced by the Union of South Africa's Nationalist government—elected this year to its third successive quinquennial term of office—has given rise to charges so grave, rebuttals so quick, or manifestoes so bitter and righteous as the 1953 Bantu Education Act. Apologists contend that nothing else shows hope of ultimate social and economic development by the South African Native within his own cultural sphere. This legislation is viewed as the least menacing to preservation of White society and the most healthfully realistic for Bantu citizens that educators have devised. Opponents hold that few Parliamentary Acts could be more unjust to an exploited majority, or, at base, more dangerous to European and Native alike. If these positions seem frozenly polarized, we might do well to remember that non-White education in the Union has historically borne the often bewildering aspect of a man buoyed along on two currents of diametrically opposite flow: dating from the earliest Dutch settlement, on stream draws the African toward those invitingly green and pleasant highlands where growth in Western forms of progress can be found; the other, with no less enduring a vigor, carries him onto Native farms and Reserves where the Bantu, whether pagan or Christian, unschooled or literate, is trained by exposure to more traditional, tribe-centered ways.

The first of these pressures has been the work, in large part, of all churches but one, of westernized Natives, liberal white edu-

cators, and the foreign press. The second approach is that of most Bantu chiefs and headmen, the Nationalist Party, Dutch Reformed Church, and Union commissions on Native education and socio-economic change. A brief survey cannot evaluate in depth all the current lines of controversy. It must, rather, piece out the more obvious and germane events in South Africa's history of Native schooling, relate to them the present-day scene, and give a feeling for the varied, sometimes inconsistent attitudes that find expression in the Union's struggle to compose its racial differences. If we can follow Santayana by denoting a fanatic as one who redoubles his effort once he has forgotten his aim, we may suppose that neither camp is altogether certain of where it is going, how it will get there, or whether it may, at the end, find the whole journey necessary.

### *From Early Settlement to Union*

Until 1800, or almost 150 years after European settlement began in what is now Cape Province, White and Native relations were confined generally to barter, peonage, warfare, and cross-breeding. The Stone-Age Bushmen were little more than targets of derision and, finally, of virtual annihilation. The Hottentots, more progressive, fared somewhat better: proselytized by Calvinistic predikants and fleeced by much less conscienceable traders, they also ingested a near-fatal dose of small-pox bacilli, together with enough white genes to form the present-day, one-million strong Cape Coloured pop-



ulation. In 1687, an elementary school organized by the Dutch East India Company became the first South African center of education to admit children of White immigrants and Hottentots (whether "pure" or mulatto) without regard to color.<sup>1</sup> But the European settler, though sharing perhaps the view of his leader, Von Riebeeck, that Hottentots were "dull, stupid, lazy, and stinking," was disturbed at mounting signs of Native restlessness and thoughts of manumission. Ascribing these latter to Western influence, "the civilizing efforts of the Company soon dwindled . . . (and) the conscious effort to Christianize . . . died away." Thus, in pointed anticipation of later Union policy, the Native was denied an education that might fit him to secure a livelihood beyond the kraal. For another century he was trained within a wholly tribal nexus as unsophisticated as what Julius Caesar found in England, or Tacitus in Germany.<sup>2</sup>

By the early 1800's, South Africa had started to receive both English and Bantu in ever-swelling numbers. Contact grew more frequent and missionary schools—chiefly Anglican, Scotch Presbyterian, and Methodist—brought the Gospel and European culture to some Natives in Cape Colony. While the overriding purpose was evangelistic, when a new convert found that he could read the Bible and religious tracts in English or his own, newly codified vernacular, he often wanted something else. Mission centers had, at mid-century, begun to reach a few erstwhile heathen with the European, classical curriculum. Lovedale, perhaps the finest and most celebrated mission school in southern Africa, was visited in 1864 by the Cape's Superintendent-General of Education, who wrote:

I examined the most advanced native scholar in a portion of a chapter of the Greek Testament, an ode of Anacreon, and a portion of the first book of the Aeneid; and put general questions on the parsing and derivation of words. He also demonstrated the 47th proposition of Euclid, Book I, which I casually selected, and a geometrical exercise connected

with it. . . . The institutions at Lovedale (he concluded) are in every respect satisfactory.<sup>3</sup>

Twenty years later, Cape mission schools exposed the Bantu to the following mosaic of Western enlightenment: art, Bible history, English songs, history, grammar and translation, geography, physics, physiology, chemistry, Latin, Greek, and French. Although just a nugatory fraction of Native children of school-going age were in attendance, they sat for the same examinations as White and Coloured students, and were "to conform in all respects to European habits and customs."<sup>4</sup>

Though mainly taught the four R's—reading, 'riting, reckoning, and religion—the Bantu was also instructed how to use an iron hoe and ox-drawn plow, measures that contributed greatly to the transformation of his pastoral, cattle-grazing, highly primitive economy to one reliant on farm cultivation. Little, however, was done with handicraft or manual arts; such practical endeavors as gardening and carpentry too often lay beyond the missionary's few resources of skill and equipment. Yet so devoted were these frontier educators that one historian finds the schooling offered Native and Coloured children superior to what the State provided for its European charges, many of whom were also mission-trained.

The general growth of Bantu education varied greatly in the essentially British provinces of Natal and Cape Colony and the Boer (Dutch) Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Twin problems of Native refugees pouring into Natal during the era of Zulu wars, and efforts at border pacification around the Cape, brought government aid in the form of grants towards vocational training and higher salaries in both these provinces. Enrollment in Cape Colony gained eight-fold between 1865 and 1891, and tripled in Natal during the next decade. Neither of the Boer regions, however, granted any State help before they came under British rule in 1902; even the Dutch Reformed Church held itself apart,



disdaining to seek religious or linguistic brethren among the Bantu.

#### *From Union to the Bantu Education Act*

The creation, in 1910, of a Union of South Africa, brought no fundamental change to provincial administration and control of Native schooling. Although Bantu affairs were declared henceforth to be a national concern, Native education (other than higher) was placed under the Provincial Councils, a move that for decades thereafter kept most of its actual dispensation in church hands. "Thus did Pontius Pilate, in the person of the Union Government, once more wash its hands of Native education," observes a writer otherwise friendly to the South African leadership.<sup>5</sup>

Higher learning for the Bantu was inaugurated in 1916 at Fort Hare College. Although no white university in South Africa has ever denied, by charter, the right of non-Europeans to enroll, only the Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, both English-speaking, have admitted them to mixed classes. (The University of Natal has separate sessions.)

In the 40-odd years from Union to the Bantu Education Act, a program of state-built and operated schools began to supplement church institutions. By 1950 they had grown to one-seventh of all Native schools, with the organization and syllabi of courses nearly uniform. An 8-year span—two sub-standards and six standards—generally comprehended teaching of morals and religion, a local vernacular, English or Afrikaans, manual and industrial arts, arithmetic, geography, history, nature study, music, hygiene, drill and games. After 1941 attendance in all the provinces was free but compulsory. As enrollment (distinct from actual attendance) rose—183,000 in 1924 to almost 900,000 thirty years later—so did the annual State expenditure, a sum that reached nearly six million pounds in 1952. Yet retardation, wastage and absenteeism claimed a toll both enormous and significant. The number of

students that entered a third year of schooling (Standard III) was barely half that which had started the 8-year cycle. In higher grades, the proportion was even more suggestive: under one-quarter by Std. V, and (in 1940) one-twentieth for schools with Std. VII; less than one in 50 reached Std. VIII. These figures would reveal far lower proportions if the sub-standards were used as starting points. Moreover, in 1950, the percentage by class of total school-age Native children (6.5 at Std. IV) and the students' median age (14.5 years, Std. IV) pointed up forcefully that educational policy and mission efforts were grossly ineffective.<sup>6</sup> The pattern of Government aid had taken its first widely organized form in 1924, when Smuts' leadership caused an annual grant of £340,000 to be given the four provinces, together with two-fifths of the Union General Native Tax Receipts (doubled by 1943). This placed the burden of Native educational growth directly on Bantu income, and for 20 years African schooling was "a struggle between a growing demand by the people for education as evinced by a growing enrollment, and a Development Account that could not develop." In 1945, financial support was given an entirely new footing: all monies (apart from mission and overseas contributions) were made a charge on the general revenue, independent of Bantu taxation. Funds allotted rose by 10 per cent annually, bringing what can probably be called an optimum rate of expansion.

#### *The Bantu Education Act*

In 1953 came total reorganization. Following in all essentials (except those dealing with fiscal provisions) the Report of the "Eiselen" Commission on Native Education, Parliament enacted four basic alterations. First, Bantu schools would henceforth be registered and inspected by the Union Department of Native Affairs instead of through provincial agencies, and would be controlled, in matters such as staff appointments, classroom procedures, and

curricula, not by missionary groups but from that Union ministry. Church bodies were permitted to retain their schools on a progressively reduced grant, convert them to private institutions, or close up and lease their buildings to the State.

Second, new curricula would be devised to ensure the preservation and enrichment of "Bantu culture"—a concept rather hard to express with precision—by incorporating tribal customs with an overlay of Christian faith and several Western economic habits, i.e. trade, coinage, and government taxation.

Third, Natives would be given an increased voice in the administration of their schools through creation of local school committees and regional school boards, all exercising a somewhat vaguely defined yet largely African power. The Act also provided for all-Bantu teaching staffs.

Finally, a block grant of 6.5 million pounds would be made annually by the Union government, with additional costs to be met from the allocation of four-fifths of Native General Tax receipts.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Who Suffers or Benefits?*

Through policy statements and unofficial remarks, Government leaders have, since

1953, praised the rather modest outline of this Act. Undergirding all its enabling legislation is the argument that unless the Bantu is schooled through a Native culture, Africans will shortly draw even to the White in competence, overturn 300 years of European *baasskap* (mastery or stewardship), and then dominate a numerically weaker (1:4) Afrikaaner-English civilization.<sup>8</sup> This broad rationalization, far more than altruistic thoughts, permeates the Government stand and confounds political opposition.

Those comparative few who see the Bantu Education Act as demeaning to both Natives and Europeans alike can only urge ideological rebuttals or suggest that Bantu westernization cannot be arrested successfully. They view educational *Apartheid* as inferior, unsound, and philosophically proper only to a neo-Fascist state.

We might, under four general rubrics of Central Control, Curriculum, Local Participation, and Finance, group and contrast the chief arguments for and against Bantu education. While these points are often in direct opposition, they draw on the same general evidence which—like the arguments themselves—can be found in Union publications of the past few decades.

#### *Pro-BEA*

#### *Anti-BEA*

### *I. Central Control*

1. Placing African learning under the Department of Native Affairs will permit that agency to co-ordinate more effectively the planning and execution of overall Bantu development; further, schools will be operated not on denominational lines of rivalry and duplication, or by following provincial boundaries, but as parts of a rationally conceived whole.

2. Future growth of Bantu schools, in quality, number and enrollment, has become too protean a job for mission and other private agencies; only the Union government has the requisite personnel and financial resources.

1. Granted that some transfer of responsibility from churches and provincial councils was in order, it should have been to the Union Department of Education, Arts, and Science—its administration embraces Coloured, Asiatic and European schools—rather than to a minister unfamiliar with pedagogy and identified in the Bantu mind with taxation, ponderous edicts, and other hated impedimenta.

2. A system of parallel church and State institutions would assure the broadest, most effectual growth, using the best experience and wealthiest purse in healthy concert.

## Pro-BEA

3. Those people vouchsafed with the administration and financing of Native schooling will now rightfully be vested with its control.

4. Since 1905, numerous investigative bodies have proposed like measures.

## Anti-BEA

3. The Department of Native Affairs is hostile to the highest Bantu aspirations, and its control of Native education will act to strengthen all the worst in *Apartheid* and tribal mores.

4. The Eiselen Commission, like those preceding it, was unrepresentative of either Bantu or church educational interests.

## II. A Bantu Curriculum

1. Mission school graduates have long formed an élite that was alienated from its own people and which sought, unrealistically, social and economic parity with the European; henceforth, educated Bantu will have greater opportunity and higher status in their own natural habitat.

2. By cutting himself off from his ancestral traditions and the security of tribal customs, the Westernized Bantu has rapidly become a frightened, deracinated, neither-here-nor-there pawn of a hostile fate and communist intriguers. Only a course of study founded on the best and most enduring Bantu ways can offer genuine contentment.

3. Religion will be given more attention than ever, freed of denominationalism, and taught so as to strengthen, not disrupt, Bantu values and environment.

4. By using a vernacular in the lower grades while introducing both official languages, Africans will learn more quickly and, on graduation, be equipped for whatever contacts may ensue with Europeans.

5. Devotion of more hours to manual and technical labor will raise the African's standard of living by increasing the number of skilled artisans and engineers.

1. Natives have shown ample concern for Western education by sending their children from the Reserves to urban centers, and by going themselves into government and White business offices, where European skills mean greater earnings and prestige.

Further, economic integration has proceeded so far in the larger towns and cities that a renaissance of tribal customs or reversal of Bantu aspirations for human equality is a chimera nourished by European fears of losing caste and economic primacy. Unless the Union industrial system is to collapse or stagnate, this ever-growing Native migration is as desirable as (without an admittedly impractical territorial *Apartheid*) it is unavoidable.

2. There is, at bottom, no such entity as "Bantu culture." We can sense merely a constantly evolving pattern of life, one that has been changing for the past hundred years under the broad impact of Western technological and ideological example; the former will not lessen, while the second—both religious and political—stands against education for any goal but personal salvation through the perfecting of all mental and spiritual faculties. Bantu schooling is therefore unchristian, undemocratic, and unworkable.

3. Omission of a relevant and essential study of universal human rights and the brotherhood of all men does violence to any true religion and will prolong Bantu interest in the false gods of superstition and communism.

4. Introducing a second foreign tongue in the lower grades will severely handicap most students, who formerly struggled to learn one and found that hard enough, and who rarely stayed longer than a few standards.

5. A new emphasis on manual work may lead easily to more neglect of higher Western factory and even office skills, while the downgrading of mathematics will further impair Bantu access to higher learning on European lines.

### Pro-BEA

6. Replacement of history, geography and civics with "environmental studies" will give Native children greater knowledge and control of their own locale, and enlist their hard-to-win enthusiasm.

### Anti-BEA

6. "Environmental studies" will mean an even less complete and balanced view of the world beyond the kraal, heightening the sense of historical and spatial peculiarity.

### III. Local Participation

1. Africans throughout the continent have grown resentful of mission schooling, and greet happily the chance to work as full partners with the State in local matters of Native education.

2. Mission leaders will be allowed to teach Christianity at certain hours, but without sectarian bias.

1. As now constituted, local "Native control" is exercised solely at the discretion and pleasure of the Minister of Native Affairs or his agents, and must be scarcely more than a rubber stamp. Further, local administration will increasingly be in the hands of illiterate chiefs and headmen, or some new puppets living off government beneficence.

2. Those people who long have borne the overwhelming brunt of civilizing the South African native, and have the most to offer, will henceforth be relegated to a role commensurate neither with their background nor their wishes.

### IV. Finance and Progress

1. By pre-setting the Union government's contribution, and calling on Bantu income for other monies required to maintain and further build up Native schools, expansion will be kept in line with future growth and demands of the African economy, thus avoiding a greater surplus of idle, restive graduates.

2. Double sessions in the lower grades will mean twice as many junior-standard pupils at no added cost.

3. Secondary education will be encouraged on both technical and academic lines, while higher learning will be expanded through creation of ethnic Bantu universities.

4. Full Native literacy can now be envisaged within 15 or 20 years.

1. As during the two parched decades before 1945, expansion will turn wholly on increased taxation of the people least able to provide it, a condition at once unfair and inhibitory.

2. Though double sessions may increase enrollment, they will mean less capable teaching, as would any savings made by the dismissal of non-Bantu staff members.

3. Segregation on higher academic levels must in good part subvert the ends of a liberal education, notwithstanding greater facilities.

4. Full Native literacy, while a function of more schools, is not the long-range goal and may be realized without keeping the new literates encased within a tribal setting that confines them to outworn talismans and fairy tales.

So runs the defence and criticism of Bantu education. Each favorable or unfriendly judgment is, of course, bound up in the complex fabric of social, political and ethical values of those who assert their validity. An old Basuto proverb says that blood has only one color, and the soul has none. But

there are few pure black and white statements in the reasoning above. In the five years since Bantu education started, mission schools have either passed from the Union scene or waged a losing fight to stay alive as non-public institutions. Under the mounting control of State officials, enrollment has

sharply risen and more Natives have been drawn into the routine daily pursuits which animate the educational system now serving more people than the systems of Belgium, Greece, Sweden or Hungary. Yet even while realizing how implacable has been the course of white South African thought toward granting any measure of equal opportunity to the Bantu, a more humanitarian programme than what now prevails might, while maintaining separate schools, acknowledge the responsibility of Europeans for raising cultural and economic standards among the Native millions. If Santayana is correct, what South Africa needs are more frequently remembered aims; for the end of all education is progress with concord, and both are more likely to flourish where each man preserves in his own mind the unbridled image of a fair society.

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<sup>1</sup>Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), pp. 33-4, 36-9, 60-63.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 70, 84. A dissent of strong but doubtful quality is voiced in a poem by Tozama Dyubeni which appeared in the November 18, 1954 issue of the radical Union weekly, *New Age*:

South Africa, the land of my birth,  
On the arrival of the whites the Africans  
were rich,

The rich culture of the African started to decay . . .

On their arrival the whites preached civilization,

The Africans wasted no time, became civilized . . .

Nowadays the Africans are in darkness,

The good result of the civilization is seen. . . .

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Edgar H. Brookes, *The History of Native Policy in South Africa From 1830 to the Present Day* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers. Beperk, 1924), p. 455.

<sup>4</sup>*Report of the Inspector of Native Education in Cape Colony*, as reprinted in P. T. Loram, *The Education of the South African Native* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1917), p. 58.

<sup>5</sup>E. G. Pells, *300 Years of Education in South Africa* (Cape Town: Juta & Co., Limited, 1957), p. 133.

<sup>6</sup>P. A. W. Cook, "Non-European Education," in *Handbook on Race Relations*, ed. by Ellen Hellman (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 365-66; E. Hellman, *Racial Laws Versus Economic and Social Forces* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1955), p. 21; Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 369; and *World Survey of Education* (Unesco, 1955), pp. 624-25.

<sup>7</sup>*Union of South Africa, Act No. 47, 1953* (Cape Town: Cape Times Ltd., Parow, C. P., 1953).

<sup>8</sup>Official population estimates for 1956 were: Bantu—9,306,000 (66.9%); Europeans—2,907,000 (20.9%); Coloured—1,281,000 (9.2%); Asiatics—421,000 (3.0%). Total: 13,915,000. See *State of the Union* (Cape Town: Culemborg Publishers, 1957), pp. 37-38.

## SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE EDUCATION

ROBERT G. TEMPLETON

One of the most promising developments in education during the past two decades has been the rapid growth of comparative education as an important field of study. Evi-

dence for this may be seen in the range of publications that have appeared, in the increase in academic course offerings, in the revival and founding of such scholarly



journals as the *International Review of Education* and the present *Review*, and in the mounting interest in field trips and exchange programs. The establishment of the Comparative Education Society also bears witness to the fact that scholars are uniting to place this relatively new discipline on as sound a foundation as possible.

Though this progress is greatly encouraging, there have persisted along with it certain tendencies and problems which, if ignored, may have serious consequences for the future development of comparative education. One such tendency is reflected in a considerable number of studies that have appeared in recent years. Though in some instances there have been clearly discernible differences in their aim, style, and content, many of these publications have been scarcely more critical or genuinely comparative than their nineteenth-century predecessors.

This is not to deny the value and the importance of the first stage of all comparative studies, which is essentially descriptive and analytical. Certainly the collection of accurate facts and information is absolutely basic to the comparative approach. The difficulty is that the first stage will be confused with later ones, that what ought to be a means will be telescoped into an end. This is particularly true in the United States at a time when the comparative student may find himself constrained to *do something* to counteract the influence of an increasing number of newspaper and magazine articles presenting all sorts of distorted interpretations of statistics and indulging in specious comparisons between American and European educational systems.

The general failure of serious studies to be genuinely comparative—to define and apply a *tertium comparationis*—is also closely related to the tendency in education to separate theory and practice and to emphasize the practical at the expense of the theoretical. This separation is to some degree a manifestation of that exaggerated

concern in modern culture for the particular, the practical, the utilitarian. It reflects a kind of scientism in education linked with a desire to get quick results that threatens to become the bane of the social sciences. At best it is "scientific" in its passion for facts. At worst it is neither science nor art, for it lacks the discipline of a body of tested theory, the rigorousness of method, and the dynamic of clear purpose so essential to both.

The temptation to ignore—or if not to ignore, to relegate to second place—the highly important considerations of theory is particularly strong in any field that has as its major focus the comparative study of problems arising from the interaction of human institutions and their environments. How much simpler it is to limit inquiry to fact-finding and description, to statistical interpretation and safe generalization! To move beyond this—or for that matter to question the adequacy of the analyses or methodology of the first stage—is to get into some very serious theoretical problems. These problems not only emphasize the close interdependence of theory and practice but also compel one to ask whether the study of comparative education can be either scientific in its humanism or humanistic in its science. On the one hand, to underestimate the importance of such problems is tantamount to encouraging the destruction of that productive tension which issues from the interplay of theory and practice and which is responsible in large part for the vigorous life of any field of study. On the other hand, to neglect the problems of theory in its relation to practice is to undermine the status of comparative education as a discipline and to limit its potentiality as one very fruitful method of inquiry.

Despite the highly significant theoretical work of such scholars as I. L. Kandel, Nicholas Hans, Friedrich Schneider, and Robert Ulich, the field of comparative education as a whole is still largely characterized by a sort of "buzzing confusion" in



the matters of aims, principles, scope, and methodology. In fact, little critical attention seems to have been given in recent years, at least in the United States, to those guiding concepts that lend this study whatever unity and purpose it does have at present. Since most of these have been stated in I. L. Kandel's highly influential *Comparative Education*, I think it would be helpful to review briefly the key conceptions of his philosophy of comparative education as a basis for touching on a few of the problems that beset contemporary theory.

Since, according to Kandel, many of the problems of education are common to all nations, one of the most important tasks for the comparative student lies in analyzing these problems, in noting the differences between educational systems and the reasons for them, and in studying the sorts of solutions worked out. Since the school, as one institution for cultural transmission, reflects the political and social ideals of the nation it serves, the study of comparative education must be grounded in an analysis of these ideals.

If one is to arrive at any genuine understanding of the meaning of the school system of a nation, one must study the influences that have determined the character of education. This means examining the history and traditions, the social, economic, and political forces which have shaped that nation's development. Most importantly one must gain an insight into the meaning of nationalism as it affects education, for this is the real basis of educational systems. By comparing the educational problems and practices of nations, along with the varied solutions to these problems, it should be possible to define a number of important principles and tendencies that are universally valid for education.

Beyond these functions, says Kandel, such a study should foster the growth of a spirit of internationalism arising from "the sense that all nations through their systems of education are contributing . . . to the work

and progress of the world." It should also clarify our ideas about education and promote the emergence of a science of education. Ultimately it should result in the definition of "a comprehensive, all-embracing philosophy of education thoroughly rooted in the culture, ideals, and aspirations which each nation should seek to add to the store of human welfare."

Such then in brief are the main tenets of Kandel's comparative program, the general outlines of which probably few students would disagree with today. And yet there are certain problems here that deserve more attention than has been given them in recent years. There is, broadly speaking, the problem of how to bridge the growing gap between present means and ideal ends. According to commonly accepted theory, the comparative approach demands at one level an intensive analysis of a number of complex relationships involving the school and society as they interact with social, economic, political, and cultural forces. Now such a study is by its very nature interdisciplinary and synthetic. If it is to have depth as well as breadth, it requires a broad grasp of the essentials of modern knowledge. One problem here concerns the degree of scholarly competence the comparative student can reasonably be expected to have if he is to make intelligent use of the resources of such disciplines as history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and related areas.

If the answer lies in more and more specialization in a field already highly specialized, how can we avoid the narrowness of aim and execution which are the very antithesis of the spirit and scope of all genuinely comparative studies? Conversely, if scholars are to attempt to use a broadly humanistic and synthetic approach, how are they to avoid the pitfalls of superficiality, vague generality, and false synthesis? It may be that the ends and scope of comparative education as presently conceived should be redefined within more realistic and manageable limits and that steps should

be taken to reconcile a few of the most glaring contradictions between theory and practice.

Some of these contradictions, arising from the complexity of the task facing the comparative student, may be noted in connection with the tendency to conduct research on unexamined assumptions and to apply guiding concepts uncritically. The recent Jacob study, *Changing Values in College*, indicates that there is little evidence to support the assumption, long cherished by the profession, that higher education in the United States plays an important role in influencing the values and beliefs of students. By the same token one wonders what degree of truth there is in the larger assumption that educational institutions in general are effective instruments for transmitting cultural ideals and values to the young. It may be, for instance, that authoritarian school systems are not as effective as they are made out to be; that the efficient indoctrination and training of the citizens of totalitarian states is more the product of a rigidly controlled, total environment and less the outcome of formal education than has been supposed. This leads to the question of whether the ends of education and the state are quite as coterminous as theory prescribes. These are merely illustrations of the sorts of problems in this area that the comparative theorist might raise.

There has also been a tendency to oversimplify methods of inquiry. Research in the social sciences has shown that the traditional categories of analysis are hardly adequate for studying the complex interaction of educational institutions, culture, and personality. How is the comparative student to approach the study of education and its problems? Is there any method or combination of methods that would be more valid and fruitful than those in current use? On the one hand, there seem to be as many hidden forces at work in modern culture as there are those open to analysis. On the other hand, the history of ed-

ucational ideas and institutions demonstrates that education, as one aspect of the social process, has roots that extend beyond the relatively artificial boundaries of national cultures. Where in our efforts to study the process of education itself are we to set the limits? Where does our analysis begin and where does it end?

Related to such questions are the problems of definition and evaluation. There is the problem of developing a comparative terminology that is precise, clear, and internationally valid. There is the need to clear away the confusions of meaning inhering in such broad concepts as growth, equality of opportunity, natural rights, education, freedom, nationalism. Such a list could be extended considerably. There still has not been developed an adequate system of educational notation and measurement with universal equivalence, nor has much progress been made toward the design of valid and reliable measuring instruments and techniques of analysis. How such problems are to be solved, or for that matter whether they at present are considered relevant or significant enough to be attacked, is to no small degree involved with another vital question: Should the comparative study of education be essentially scientific or humanistic in aim, scope, and method?

Obviously such considerations plunge one immediately into the extremely complicated problems of value in comparative education. Some students will wonder whether there is a body of values and ideals that is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to serve as a common meeting ground for such diverse groups of thinkers as idealists, pragmatists, and materialists. Or is it enough that students take as their point of departure the canons of critical scholarship and the ideals of honest inquiry and search? If it strikes some as ridiculous to think in terms of trying to develop a science of values, a science of human behavior, or even a science of education, it may be that the problems in these very areas will even-

tually provide a broad base for harmonizing the conflicting claims of both humanism and science in comparative studies. Be that as it may, the problem of reconciling the opposing demands of unity and diversity in this field, as in others, remains. And in this respect it is doubtful whether the quest for "a comprehensive, all-embracing philosophy of education" would provide a desirable solution, even if it were attainable. For many thinkers, in fact, such a unity of belief about the nature and ends of education would be antithetical to that freedom of inquiry and search for truth upon which all genuine educational progress depends.

Certainly one of the most important tasks we can achieve is a gradual clarification of the meaning of key concepts in education in terms of the insights provided by new knowledge regarding the needs, problems, and aspirations of mankind. Along with this we need to work toward a deeper understanding of the nature of education itself, its meaning as a process, and its limitations as well as its unrealized possibilities. We need to know more about what ends education can best serve in promoting the full development of human beings. Again,

through a careful study of the forces that impinge upon education and the positive influences education may exert, it may be possible to define the means by which schools can become more humanizing forces for the promotion of freedom, justice, and goodness.

These then are some of the problems that face the student of comparative education who wishes to work toward a closer union of theory and practice—toward sounder foundations for a growing discipline that seeks to be comparative in something more than spirit. What seems to be urgently needed at present is a critical examination and enlargement of the current body of comparative educational theory, a broader, more valid, and realistic formulation of aims, scope, values, and techniques on the basis of new knowledge and contemporary educational problems and practices. Unless this can be achieved, the study of comparative education runs the risk of becoming either so narrowly descriptive or so superficial and aimless in scope that its great promise for making a contribution to "a practical study of philosophy and principles of education" may remain unrealized.

## IS COMPARATIVE EDUCATION A DISCIPLINE?

KATHRYN G. HEATH

Is Comparative Education an academic discipline? Perhaps this is a pertinent question to ask as the Comparative Education Society finalizes its initial constitution and by-laws and enters its third year as an organization.

What is a discipline? Briefly, it is a calling requiring a specialized body of knowledge which is applied with skill for a

humanitarian purpose. In general, those callings which qualify under criteria such as the following ten represent fields of endeavor known as disciplines:

1. A discipline defines its body of specialized knowledge. Have comparative educators defined their specialized body of knowledge? What is comparative education?

2. A discipline is intellectual in character and presupposes a liberal education as a foundation for judicious exercise of freedom, taking of risk, and assumption of responsibility required in the application of specialized knowledge. What is the educational foundation for work in comparative education?

3. A discipline requires its practitioners to have specialized training. The type and the length of such training play their part in the professional status accorded to the trained and to the field of endeavor itself. In itself, "playing by ear" need not be quackery; neither is it the way of the professional. What type and how much specialized training is required to become a comparative educator? Do any comparative educators "play by ear"?

4. A discipline requires an in-service learning period for those wishing to enter the field. Normally, it occurs in a professional school with laboratory facilities which permit the student to try his wings in his chosen field under the expert guidance of professionally qualified and experienced personnel. As in the case of the specialized training, type and length of the in-service learning process play their part in determining the status of the trained and the status of the calling. What in-service learning process is required in the field of comparative education?

5. A discipline is a career field—not a stepping-stone to another career. Are comparative educators careerists?

6. A discipline performs a function which no other field of endeavor performs. What is the unique function of comparative education?

7. A discipline defines and establishes the paths of entry—formal education, in-service training, and practical experience required—and a system of recognition for those who qualify—and then gains recognition for its standards by others. What are the paths of entry into comparative education? Who recognizes the standards?

8. A discipline establishes a code of procedure to which its practitioners agree to adhere. Freedom to determine action and how it shall be carried out in a unique field carries with it responsibility for performance evaluation against defined standards and a means for disciplining offenders and protecting the uninitiated against malpractice. What is the code of procedure in comparative education? How is it enforced?

9. A discipline exists for the benefit of humanity. An indirect dividend from focussing its efforts on steadily improving its unique service to humanity is improvement in general level of living for its practitioners. How does comparative education serve humanity? What is being done by comparative educators to improve the service?

10. A discipline binds its practitioners together in formal association. Through such formal association, members set and maintain their standards, assure ethical practice, encourage likely candidates to qualify for entry into the field, and exchange information and experience for the sake of helping each other to improve their service to mankind. Comparative educators have banded themselves together in the Comparative Education Society.

Is comparative education a discipline?

*Readers are invited to send comments on this article and to express their views on the proposed draft of the constitution copies of which will be sent upon request by the Business Editor.*

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